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Abstract 
Military market places display obvious inefficiencies under most 
arrangements, but the Soviet defense market was unusual for its degree 
of monopoly, exclusive relationships, and intense scrutiny (in its 
formative years) by a harsh dictator. This provided the setting for 
quality versus quantity in the delivery of weapons to the government. 
The paper discusses the power of the industrial contractor over the 
defense buyer in terms of a hold-up problem. The typical use that the 
contractor made of this power was to default on quality. The defense 
ministry’s counter-action took the form of deploying agents through 
industry with the authority to verify quality and reject substandard 
goods. The final compromise restored quality at the expense of 
quantity. Being illicit, it had to be hidden from the dictator. 
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 Quantity versus Quality in  
the Soviet Market for Weapons 
This paper is about an absolutely standard problem in industrial 
organization: contracting for goods when quality matters. What makes 
it novel is the context. What difference does it make when the 
contractor is placed not within a law-governed market economy but 
under a centralized dictatorship? When at any moment the dictator can 
step in, tear up the contract, and shoot the contractor? 
Contracting for quality is a problem the world over in markets for 
defense goods and services. The quality of goods and services was 
specifically a problem in most if not all markets in the Soviet economy. 
In its military sector, however, the defense ministry was willing to incur 
the significant cost of employing tens of thousands of military 
procurement officers to work on site with the contractors to enforce 
contractual standards for the quality of military goods, endowed with 
sweeping powers to test and reject deliveries. As a result, the military 
agents were able to learn about many if not all dimensions of the 
quality of the goods they were accepting. 
Our research has thrown up a puzzle. The military agents were not 
apparently corrupt, and were genuinely tough on the enforcement of 
quality standards. But they often colluded with contractors to conceal 
quantitative violations of the plan for deliveries of weapons, not on a 
purely private basis but with their superiors' clear knowledge and 
approval. We attribute this to a hold-up problem in the market for 
weapons. In this paper we will set out where we think the problem 
came from and how it worked out, and we will discuss the evidence 
base for our reasoning. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Part 1, we discuss the 
particular institutional arrangements of the Soviet defense market. Part 
2 suggests how the hold-up problem arose and why the advantage lay 
on the side of the seller. Part 3 presents our model of how the problem 
worked out. In this model bargaining power and collusion decide the 
final outcome, and Parts 4 and 5 discuss the supporting documentary 
evidence on bargaining power and collusion respectively. The final 
section concludes. 
1. Quality and Quantity in Defense Markets 
In all countries, markets for military goods do not work well. This is to 
a large extent independent of the constitution of the state and the social 
and economic system. In all countries, whether ownership is private or 
collective, and whether rulers are democratic or authoritarian, the 
agents on each side of the defense market are powerful and well 
connected. On one side a senior minister manages a government 
monopsony: there is only one significant customer for such items as 
heavy artillery, aircraft, and battleships. On the other side is a charmed 
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circle of big defense contractors. A few large-scale corporations supply 
such weapons; their ability to squeeze money out of government is 
augmented by the fact that they are too important for production, 
employment, and national security for the government to let them fail. 
As a direct result, defense markets everywhere are notorious for cost 
overruns, delayed deliveries, quality shortfalls, subsidies, and 
kickbacks.  
It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that defense markets 
everywhere are uniformly the same. Just among the market economies, 
national arrangements have been shown to vary significantly in the 
degree of competition, public accountability, rent seeking, and softness 
of budget constraints on defense suppliers (Eloranta 2008). The Soviet 
market for military goods also shows several unique and fascinating 
features; in particular, both buyer and sellers were state-owned, so that 
it was to a large extent an artificial or internal market. Despite this, it 
supplied an army that won World War II and threatened the West for 
the next half century. Thus it is fully worthy of detailed study. 
In writing about the market for weapons we do not mean that there 
was a market relationship between the Red Army and the defense 
ministry as unified organizations. At this high level there was political 
bargaining between the defense minister and a few industrial ministers, 
not a market relationship. The internal market tended to emerge at 
lower levels where individual military purchasing administrations had 
to select suppliers and negotiate terms with individual defense factories 
(Markevich and Harrison 2006). 
We suggest that the market had less scope to develop for products 
where models were established and were in serial production year after 
year so that each year's contracts could be planned in advance on the 
basis of the previous year's experience. But for many lines including 
aircraft, ships, tanks, and engines defense buyers were continually 
trying to place contracts for new or unique items. Innovation in 
military machine technologies seems to have been particularly rapid in 
the mid-1930s and this accelerated the year-to-year turnover of 
products (Davies and Harrison 1997). In such periods even the crudest 
version of directive planning was impossible because it was never clear 
beforehand who would produce them and how many, to what quality 
standards, or at what price. This greatly extended the scope for market-
oriented behavior. 
The most important problem in the Soviet military market was the 
quality of weapons. By "quality" we mean the observable characteristics 
of fabricated goods such as their reliability or performance. Both 
quantity and quality can be observed. But they differ in the time and 
effort required to observe and verify them. Quantity is easily observed 
and verified, and quality less so. 
Other investigations of Soviet defense procurement (Harrison and 
Simonov 2000, Markevich and Harrison 2006) have considered 
aspects of quality that were not freely observable at the time of 
purchase so that the buyer may not know the quality of what is bought 
until afterward. In this paper we look at the problem that arises when 
quality is observed before purchase but cannot be verified: the buyer is 
aware of substandard quality but cannot prove it to a third party.  
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The defense market was not the only part of the Soviet economy 
that had a problem with quality. Sheltered from competition and 
guaranteed economic survival by state plans, civilian factory managers 
faced strong temptations to seek a quiet life for themselves and their 
employees by fulfilling the plan for least effort (Granick 1954; Berliner 
1957). The authorities assigned plans in rubles of gross output subject 
to fixed plan prices and quality specifications (tekhnicheskie usloviia). 
Quality, however, was costly to the producer. As we now know, virtually 
everything in the Soviet command system that appeared fixed was 
negotiable in practice, including plans and prices. Once plans and 
prices had been written down, however, the main scope for the factory 
to economize on effort lay in finding ways to reduce quality that were 
hard to verify. 
In the hope of limiting such producer opportunism the authorities 
relied firstly on industrial self-regulation. Every factory, civilian or 
military, had its own quality department or OTK (otdel tekhnicheskogo 
kontrolia) responsible for ensuring that its products came up to 
standard. Not surprisingly, this was largely ineffective: managers had 
little incentive to make self-regulation stick, and the staff employed to 
carry out quality assurance typically saw themselves as low-status 
employees paid to provide a fig-leaf to cover up for management when 
things went wrong; when they tried to work professionally to external 
benchmarks, managers slapped them down (Harrison and Simonov 
2000; Markevich and Harrison 2006). 
Above the factory level, the ministers in charge of the supply of 
military goods had to account for their quality to Stalin and this forced 
them to care about quality; periodically, at least, they said that they did. 
When they spoke up for quality, they often made inspirational speeches 
and issued decrees about the enforcement of standards and 
benchmarks that were accompanied by fearsome threats of punishment 
for violation. In practice, however, the ministry had its own plan to 
fulfil; conscientious adherence to quality standards could threaten not 
only the incomes of workers and managers but also the authority and 
prestige of the minister. Declarations in favor of quality beforehand 
tended to give way to a crude quantity drive in the course of events. 
By focusing on the problem of quality we do not mean to imply that 
the Red Army's military equipment was not good enough to fight wars 
and win battles. The quality of weapons has both economic and military 
aspects that are conceptually distinct, although practically related. The 
economic aspect of quality decides whether the equipment creates 
producer and consumer surpluses sufficient for both buyer and seller to 
be willing to agree the terms of an exchange beforehand and remain 
satisfied with the results afterward. The military aspect decides 
whether the buyer can use the weapons to beat the enemy. In World 
War II, Soviet weapons such as the T-34 tank, BM-13 "Katiusha" rocket 
mortar, and Il-2 assault aircraft won a reputation for rugged 
serviceability and firepower. Militarily, they were good enough. This 
does not mean that they always performed according to contract. This 
chapter is about the economic aspect of quality: on what terms was the 
defense contractor willing to provide it, and did defense buyers get 
what they paid for? This is an important problem because, even if the 
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weapons were good enough for the battlefield, it determined the price 
that had to be paid to get them. 
2. The Hold-Up Problem in the Soviet Defense Market 
The hold-up problem provides a way of understanding quality issues in 
the Soviet market for weapons. A hold-up can arise wherever one 
partner must invest in an exclusive relationship with another in order 
to realize the benefits of a potential exchange (Goldberg 1976: 439; 
Williamson 1985: 61-63). In a market in which buyer and seller have an 
exclusive relationship, the hold-up can arise on either side or both sides 
at once, but in our case it will generally be one-sided: the buyer cannot 
identify and select the best-matched seller without first undertaking a 
costly search, exchange of information, and negotiation. 
Suppose the buyer faces a fixed selection cost, which is also the cost 
of switching from one seller to another. Once it is formed, the 
relationship with the particular seller is then worth at least this fixed 
cost to the buyer and this value is what the buyer stands to lose if the 
initial relationship breaks down. It becomes part of the quasi-rent that 
is the profit created by the relationship, but it need not accrue to the 
buyer. Who actually receives it will depend on post-contract 
renegotiation. The seller can hold up the buyer: by threatening to 
withdraw from the relationship, the seller can face the buyer with a 
potential loss at least equal to the switching cost so the buyer should be 
willing to pay the seller up to this value to avoid this loss. The extent of 
the transfer will depend on the relative bargaining strengths of the two 
sides; the party with more to lose is more likely to lose it.  
The risk presented by the hold-up problem is that, in order not to be 
held up and so make a loss, agents will avoid investing in the 
relationship-specific assets that make them vulnerable; as a result, 
society as a whole will lose the gains from trade. The hold-up problem 
has standard solutions, however, that should bring the incentives of the 
buyer and supplier approximately back into alignment (Schmitz 2001). 
Vertical integration brings the parties together under a single authority 
and completely replaces their market relationship by hierarchy. There 
are also intermediate solutions that retain the market relationship but 
regulate it by long-term contracts with some combination of joint 
financing of initial joint costs and contingent rules for distributing the 
subsequent benefits. 
In market economies defense markets are generally thought to have 
a potential for hold-up problems (Rogerson 1994), with the advantage 
to the buyer. Defense contractors must acquire specialized research and 
production assets in order to produce goods for which there is only a 
single purchaser; if the relationship ends or breaks down these assets 
will be less valuable in their best alternative use. In both world wars, for 
example, the vast capital expansion of war industries in the major 
market economies had to overcome business resistance and was largely 
government-financed for this reason. During World War II, for 
example, the U.S. Defense Plant Corporation and other federal agencies 
provided and afterward wrote off capital facilities for war production to 
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the private sector that Robert J. Gordon (1969) valued at $45 billion (at 
1958 prices). 
In the Soviet case the producer did not have this vulnerability. 
Soviet firms generally acquired capital goods free of charge, the cost to 
society being made up by government grants. In the market for military 
equipment this weakened the hand of the defense ministry and 
eliminated any scope for it to hold up the industrial contractors. The 
latter could still hold up the defense ministry, on the other hand, as 
long as defense buyers faced positive selection costs.  
It seems unlikely that selection was a problem for the buyer of 
established products that did not change from one year to the next. 
Once contractors and their capacities were known from experience they 
could be written into plans, and as long as the product assortment did 
not change this limited their bargaining power. When the military 
needed a new product in contrast, defense buyers had to expend 
significant resources on identifying potential suppliers and negotiating 
with them. In other words, we can think of Soviet defense purchasing 
as going on partly within a vertically integrated sphere where planners 
assigned quotas for established products to established suppliers, and 
partly in an internal market where new suppliers had to be found for 
new products. 
For new products the defense ministry was forced each year to wage 
a frustrating military-style "contracts campaign" (described in detail by 
Markevich 2008) in the internal market, in order to place new orders 
with industrial suppliers. In an earlier study Harrison and Simonov 
(2000: 231) identified major obstacles to the contracts campaign as 
"the difficulty of finding willing suppliers of new defense products, and 
the desire of industry to secure a relatively homogenous assortment 
plan which would allow concentration on long runs of main products 
without a lot of attention to spare parts and auxiliary components, no 
matter how essential to the customer"; the resistance of potential 
contractors could go so far as to leave significant orders completely 
unfilled.  
When the placing of contracts ran into difficulties, the government 
was reluctant to intervene on principle; it insisted that the defence 
ministry had to solve its problems with industry on the basis of their 
informal working relationship.1 When the defense ministry appealed to 
the government to force state-owned enterprises to accept its orders, 
the government typically did not take action.2.Even in the course of 
accelerated rearmament, industrial firms were able to refuse defense 
orders with impunity. In 1938, for example, defense industry factory 
no. 145, the sole supplier of two-headed lubricators for artillery, refused 
a contract on the grounds that its workshop was under reconstruction; 
                                                   
1 GARF, 8418/4/39: 1 (Rykov to Voroshilov and Kuibyshev, 1930). 
2 GARF, 8418/24/2: 7-9. (Ivanov and Nikolaev to Safonov, 1934). 
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meanwhile, it started to sell off unique equipment required for the 
manufacture of these products.3  
We suggest that search costs in the internal market left the Soviet 
defense buyer vulnerable to a hold-up. Given this, what form did the 
hold-up take? Under Soviet arrangements, once the contracts campaign 
was over, the main opportunity for the seller lay in undershooting on 
quality, knowing that the buyer would have difficulty in taking its 
business away. The buyer, in turn, could limit but not eliminate the 
harm imposed by the seller’s behavior by accepting an illegal 
compromise. The compromise required conspiracy between the parties 
since, if not hidden, it would trigger an intervention by the dictator that 
both parties preferred to avoid. 
3. A Model 
We illustrate with a simple dynamic game of three moves: the defense 
buyer's search, the contractor's hold-up, and a readjustment. 
There are two players, Defense and the Contractor. Defense aims to 
maximise the military utility of its available equipment, derived from 
some expectation of its effectiveness in use on the battlefield. This 
effectiveness is decided by their quantity and quality. Defense seeks a 
Contractor to supply units of a particular weapon, for example a tank or 
an airplane, that can be of high or low quality. The Contractor aims to 
maximise a surplus over costs. This surplus could be measured equally 
well in monetary terms or in terms of the reduced effort required to 
extract Defense’s cash; which is more appropriate depends on the form 
in which rents were shared within the Soviet industrial firm, but does 
not matter for present purposes.  
Off stage is a Dictator, whom we do not model explicitly (but see 
Markevich 2007). The Dictator shares Defense's preferences over 
quality and, when the players have contracted between themselves, he 
validates the contract and, where necessary and possible, he intervenes 
to give it force; he will punish contract violations that are verifiable.  
In our model, only quantity is verifiable. When the quality of 
performance matters, a contract can be performed consummately or 
perfunctorily. Oliver Hart and John Moore (2006), for example, 
"suppose that trade is only partially contractible. Specifically, we 
distinguish between perfunctory performance and consummate 
performance, or performance within the letter of the contract and 
performance within the spirit of the contract. Perfunctory performance 
can be judicially enforced, while consummate performance cannot." In 
our model consummate performance is more costly to the producer, 
and perfunctory performance is less valuable to the buyer. 
The supply side of our economy has two sectors. There is a vertically 
integrated sphere in which a high-priority buyer such as the defense 
ministry can routinely procure goods of low quality; that is, on being 
notified of military requirements, the planner can assign the 
production quota to a producer that, selected randomly, provides low 
                                                   
3 RGAE, 7515/1/404: 46-53 (Savchenko to Mikhail Kaganovich, 
1938). 
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quality and low cost. Items of high quality are available only within an 
internal market that the buyer must search to identify an appropriate 
contractor. While the administered sphere is governed by hierarchy 
and arbitrary assignment, the internal market is governed by matching, 
negotiation, and contracts.  
Before the game, the Dictator endows Defense with a fixed sum of 
rubles for the procurement of weapons. We normalise this budget to 
S+1  where S  is the fixed cost of searching for a high-quality 
contractor; S  is payable if and only if Defense chooses to search.  
Figure 1. Timing and Payoffs 
 
Note: Payoffs are (Defense, Contractor). 
Symbols: 
α Probability that Nature permits high quality  
β Bargaining power of Defense 
c Contractor's relative cost per unit of low quality: 01 >> c  
D Deadweight loss from hold-up 
S  Defense's fixed cost of search 
v Defense's relative utility per unit of low quality: 01 >>> vc  
Figure 1 illustrates the timing of the game. At various points 
Defense must take its budget, or what is left of it, either to the 
administered sphere (to the right) or to the market (down and to the 
left). At the first move Defense can seek to allocate this budget to 
weapons of High and Low quality, and Low has the advantage over 
1. Defense 
Searches Does Not Search 
( ) 0,1 S
c
v +⋅  
2. Contractor 
Holds up Complies ( )0,1  
3. Defense 
Adjusts 
D
c
v
D
c
v ⋅−−⋅+ ββ 1,  
Walks Away 
0,
c
v
 
Acquiesces 
D
c
v
c
v −−1,  
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High that it is available without search. If Defense chooses at the outset 
to procure goods from the administered sphere without searching, its 
entire budget of S+1  can be spent on Low. Under the prevailing law of 
contracts and prices, the low-quality items are acquired at cost, so the 
producer receives a zero surplus. 
Alternatively, Defense can enter the market for High by paying the 
search cost S as an entry fee. Down this path, Defense and the 
Contractor agree terms for a contract, but S  is now a sunk cost so 
Defense can commit only 1 to the purchase of High.  
Down the path to the internal market, the Contractor must deliver 
units of High to Defense in contractually agreed quantities and 
qualities, for example, 500 tanks of a specific model and subject to 
agreed technical and performance standards, at prices fixed on the 
basis of the Contractor's production costs. In that case the Contractor 
again covers its costs and receives zero. 
For the Contractor, consummate fulfilment is no better than loss of 
the contract. Perfunctory fulfilment is the only way the Contractor can 
extract a surplus of revenue over costs, and this must be at the expense 
of Defense. The Contractor’s surplus could be gained by delivering the 
agreed number of tanks produced with lower standards of care or 
quality of materials, for example. As a result the quality standards 
agreed in the contract would be violated, and the tanks would be of less 
military value than Defense anticipated.  
In the second move along this path the Contractor chooses between 
consummate and perfunctory execution of the contract, and 
perfunctory execution is its dominant strategy.  
Given perfunctory fulfilment, the third move belongs to Defense, 
which at first sight must either acquiesce (to the left), or walk away (to 
the right), leave the market and return to the administered sphere 
where it can spend its remaining budget on Low. This option provides 
Defense with its reservation utility, which turns out to be cv . Defense 
will acquiesce provided its loss from perfunctory fulfilment is kept 
within a limit set by this reservation utility.  
The Dictator will also acquiesce provided that the total number of 
units of any quality remains the contracted number. It is true that he 
shares Defense's preference for consummate fulfilment, and in 
principle Defense could appeal to the Dictator for justice, but the latter 
could observe only the quantity, not the quality of fulfilment. Or, in 
other words, we assume that the probability of proving perfunctory 
fulfilment in court was zero.  
We will show that the Contractor’s gain is less than the harm done 
to Defense; there is a deadweight loss D. Our intuition is that the hold-
up involves the substitution of Low for High, and the relative cost of 
Low must exceed its relative utility ( vc > ) since otherwise Low would 
always be preferred. This creates an opportunity for Defense to lessen 
the harm done and offer a benefit to both parties in further 
renegotiation. A final round of bargaining eliminates the deadweight 
loss by restoring quality at the expense of quantity. The two parties 
share the gain in proportion to their mutual bargaining power, β for 
Defense, so 1 – β for the Contractor. Because bargaining is at the 
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expense of quantity, however, there is no longer even perfunctory 
fulfilment. The fact that the contract is no longer fulfilled in quantity 
risks the intervention of the Dictator. Only Defense can give permission 
for this to go forward, and must collude with the Contractor to hide it. 
We now analyse the players' possible payoffs. At the outset the 
Dictator gives Defense a budget of S+1 rubles to procure a stock of a 
particular weapon. Defense has preferences over weapons that can be 
of high or low quality based on their military applications, so its 
(military) utility function is: 
LvHV ⋅+=  (1) 
Here H and L are the (non-negative) quantities of High and Low 
respectively. For calibration each unit of H gives Defense one unit of 
utility, and v is the relative utility of a unit of L. Defense maximises V, 
subject to procurement costs C remaining within its budget, but the 
amount of its budget that will be available to spend on procurement 
depends on whether or not Defense engages in the costly search for a 
high quality supplier. Thus:  
No search: SC +≤ 1  (2) 
Search: 1≤C  (2a) 
Meanwhile, procurements costs are also the Contractor’s production 
costs: 
LcHC ⋅+=  (3) 
Again for calibration, each unit of H costs the Contractor one ruble and 
c is the relative ruble cost of a unit of L. We assume that the unit value 
and cost of High exceed the unit value and cost of Low respectively, and 
the relative unit cost of Low to the seller exceeds its relative value to the 
buyer: 
01 >>> vc  (4) 
How much utility is available to Defense depends, first, on its choice to 
search or not. If Defense declines to search and sets out to procure only 
Low, given the cash available, and combining equations (1) and (3) with 
inequality (2), it follows that its utility and procurement will be: 
( )S
c
v
V searchno +⋅≤− 1  and ( )ScL searchno +⋅≤− 11  (5) 
If Defense searches the market and finds a Contractor for High, in 
contrast, the utility available to it from a contract is found by 
combining equations (1) and (3) with inequality (2a): 
( ) LvcVsearch ⋅−−≤ 1    (5b) 
From (4), and using stars to denote the terms of Defense’s optimal 
contract, this expression is maximized when L = 0, so: 
1* =V ; 1* =H ; 0* =L  (6) 
We find the motivation for the subsequent hold up in the 
Contractor’s problem: since its contract revenue cannot exceed 1, it can 
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create a surplus only by reducing total costs (equation 3) below the 
contracted level. The Contractor will covertly substitute units of Low 
for the same number of units of High, one for one, up to a limit set by 
two constraints. One is Defense's participation constraint, and the 
other is the Dictator’s intervention constraint. We assume that, while 
the Dictator shares Defense’s preference for high quality, he does not 
observe the substitution; he sees only the number of items delivered. 
He has no basis to intervene while this number matches the quantity 
H* stipulated in the contract. The Contractor is safe while it delivers 
*HLH ≥+ . Recall that 1* =H , so we will write the Dictator’s 
intervention constraint as: 
LH −≥ 1  (7) 
As for keeping up the contractual relationship, the Contractor must 
maintain Defense at or above its reservation utility. This is the utility 
that would be available if Defense now stopped trying to procure High, 
walked away from the contract, returned to the administered sphere, 
and asked the planner to assign a supplier of Low. Combining 
equations (1) and (3) with inequality (2a) and setting H = 0 gives the 
utility from spending 1 in this way as cv  and this is Defense's 
reservation utility. Using primes to denote the values obtaining in the 
hold-up, it gives us Defense's participation constraint: 
Lv
c
v
H ⋅−≥  (8) 
Combining equations (7) and (8), Defense will remain within the 
relationship and the Dictator will not intervene as long as: 
v
vc
c
L −
−⋅≥′
1
1
 and 
v
c
c
v
H −
−⋅≥′
1
1
 (9) 
Figure 2 illustrates the hold-up in High, Low space. The contract 
was made where the Contractor's offer curve C* meets Defense's 
budget-constrained indifference curve V* at the vertical (H) axis.  
In the hold-up the Contractor moves down the Dictator’s 
intervention constraint until it reaches the point of intersection with 
Defense’s participation constraint. The Dictator's intervention 
constraint is a downward-sloping 45o line along which the combined 
numbers of H and L remain unchanged from the number of H specified 
in the contract. Above this line the Dictator observes customary 
bickering among his agents but will see verifiable grounds for 
intervention only below the line. Defense's participation constraint is a 
line with the same slope as V*, displaced downwards by the utility, 
measured in units of H, that Defense will give up before reaching its 
reservation utility and renouncing the contract. Above this line Defense 
knows it is being cheated, but it will walk away only below the line.  
Payoffs to each side now vary from those anticipated in the contract. 
The relative magnitudes are driven by our assumption that the 
comparative cost of Low exceeds the comparative utility of High 
(inequality 4: 01 >>> vc ). Military utility was previously 1. The 
Contractor's perfunctory fulfilment drives it down to the reservation 
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level cv . The Contractor's utility was previously zero. Now it increases 
because the substitution of Low for High reduces total costs that, under 
consummate fulfilment, were also previously equal to 1. The reduction 
in total costs, which is the Contractor’s gain, may be computed from 
equations (3) and (9) as 
v
vc
v
c
c
v
−
−−−
−⋅−
11
1
1 . 
Figure 2. The Hold-Up 
 
The chief proposition of the model is that in the hold-up, total costs 
fall by less than the reduction in military utility, so there is a 
deadweight loss. The loss is found by subtracting the Contractor's gain 
from Defense's loss, that is: 
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−
−−−
−⋅−−−=
v
vc
v
c
c
v
c
v
D
11
1
11  (10) 
which simplifies to 
( )
( )vc
vc
−⋅
−
1
2
. Again from 01 >>> vc  we can check that 
( )
( ) 011
2
>−⋅
−>
vc
vc
 and D is a positive fraction. 
Anticipating such losses, what can Defense do? The standard 
solutions that we listed above involve market regulation by long-term 
contracts or market suppression through vertical integration. In the 
Soviet context we see that the standard solutions could not apply. Stalin 
ruled out vertical integration of Defense with the Contractor because he 
did not want to encourage the formation of a powerful military-
industrial complex. The historical record shows that military interests 
advocated integration with the defense industry, but Stalin opposed it 
and quickly ruled it out. In 1927, for example, army commanders 
High Quality Items (units) 
1 
45o 
V ′ : participation constraint 
Low Quality Items (units) 
D
c
v −  c
v
 
D 
Dictator’s intervention constraint 
v
vc
c −
−⋅
1
1
 
LvHV ⋅−= 1:*  
LcHC ⋅−= 1:*  
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Tukhachevskii, chief of the general staff, and Unshlikht, a member of 
the Revolutionary Military Council, sought powers for the Red Army 
over appointments to the defense industry, plans and reports of defense 
producers, and plans for capital investment in the industry Stalin 
rejected these proposals (Harrison and Simonov 2000: 230; Samuelson 
2000: 42-47; Sokolov 2008). Tukhachevskii's subsequent resignation 
as chief of staff was most likely prompted by the failure of his ambition 
to control the defense industry (Samuelson 2000: 55-59). As for 
Stalin's motivations, divide-and-rule was a basic mechanism on which 
he built his power and this included keeping soldiers and industrialists 
at odds (Harrison 2003). Finally, vertical integration may have been 
impractical when military-technical requirements and industrial 
technologies were changing rapidly. 
An intermediate solution to the hold-up problem is long-term 
contracting. Again, Defense could not apply this in the Soviet context. 
One reason is that, under Soviet rules, all contracts were rewritten at 
least once a year (Markevich 2008); no long term contract was worth 
more than the paper it was printed on. More formally, the Dictator 
could not credibly promise to uphold long-term agreements between 
Defense and the Contractor for sharing the gains from trade since he 
visibly had the power to break any contract and could not bind himself. 
Finally, long-term contracting may have been ruled out by the same 
rapidly changing military-technical requirements and industrial 
technologies. 
Defense’s last resort was to strike a bargain with the Contractor to 
restore quality at the expense of quantity, eliminate the deadweight 
loss, and share the gain from doing so. The gain was shared according 
to the players’ relative bargaining power. Defense was still held up by 
the Contractor, but less inefficiently than otherwise. In the process the 
Dictator’s intervention constraint was violated and so the readjustment 
was sustainable only if the players colluded to conceal the violation.  
First, we define limits on the bargain. At one limit, defense could 
keep the entire gain by holding the Contractor’s costs constant. Total 
costs at hold-up, producing some low quality items, were 
v
vc
v
c
c
v
−
−−−
−⋅
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1
 
(equation 10). In the figure, all points in the shaded triangle lie in the 
forbidden zone below the Dictator’s intervention constraint, the 45o 
line. We use double-primes to denote the values resulting from the 
readjustment. Increasing the delivery of High and eliminating Low 
from the package, for the same cost the Contractor could deliver: 
HD
c
v
H boundupper ′>+=′′ −  and 0=′′L  (11) 
At the other limit, the Contractor could keep the entire gain by 
holding Defense at its reservation utility cv . The Contractor could 
achieve this by eliminating low-quality items from the package and 
delivering: 
H
c
v
H boundlower ′>=′′ −  and 0=′′L  (12) 
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The shaded triangle in Figure 3 illustrates the upper and lower limits of 
the compromise. The arrow pointing northwest shows the direction of 
the resulting move. All points in the shaded triangle lie in the forbidden 
zone below the Dictator’s intervention constraint, the 45o line. 
Figure 3. Readjustment 
 
The final outcome can be thought of as arising from the exogenous 
bargaining power β of Defense as a weighted average of the two 
bounds, so: 
D
c
v
H ⋅+=′′ β  (13) 
Whatever bargain is struck, however, *HH <′′ . The plan is being 
violated in quantity, and the final readjustment moves both players into 
a region where the Dictator would intervene on being informed. The 
Contractor faces a clear risk: after the bargain, Defense can denounce it 
to the dictator for breaking the contract in quantity, and the Dictator 
can confiscate the Contractor's surplus or worse. To be willing to strike 
the bargain, the Contractor must bind Defense not to denounce it 
afterward, and Defense must be willing to be bound. There has to be a 
mechanism for collusion: Defense must join a conspiracy that hides not 
just the hold-up but also the bargain that restores quality at the 
expense of quantity. Otherwise, both sides will have to accept the 
deadweight loss and remain at the hold-up. 
Finally, by weighing up all possible outcomes of the game, we learn 
about Defense’s best initial choice. The best outcome for Defense is 
consummate fulfilment of the contract, which pays 1. But only 
perfunctory fulfilment pays the Contractor a surplus, so that is what the 
Contractor will always prefer. Given that Defense decided to search for 
high quality and because the Contractor will never deliver consummate 
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performance, Defense's payoff from the illicit bargain dominates all 
others. Backward induction then tells Defense whether or not to search 
in the first place. In this game, Defense's best choice is to search the 
market only if the unconditional expected payoff from search and 
contract followed by hold-up and renegotiation, D
c
v ⋅+ β ,  exceeds the 
payoff ( )S
c
v +⋅ 1  from going straight to the administered sphere without 
searching first; simplifying, 
Search if SvDc ⋅>⋅⋅β  (14) 
In words, Defense should prefer to search for High only when its 
relative bargaining power, the relative cost of Low, and the potential 
deadweight loss (which stands for the scope for bargaining after the 
hold-up), are sufficiently large in comparison with the relative utility of 
Low and the cost of searching. 
4. Bargaining Power 
What decided bargaining power? The main instrument that the defense 
ministry used for bargaining in the market for weapons was its network 
of purchasing officers and the knowledge and experience that they 
could bring to bear. 
The defense ministry's use of teams of serving officers, the so-called 
military agents (voennye predstaviteli, voenpredy) permanently 
deployed to contractors' sites to regulate procurement from industry 
has been described previously in the literature on quality in the Soviet 
defense market (e.g. Albrecht 1993, Alexander 1978, Almquist 1990, 
Holloway 1982). It is well known that the military agents were charged 
with oversight of production, including adherence to technological 
standards and delivery schedules. To fulfil these obligations the 
military agents were entitled to free access to the entire factory site at 
any time, day or night, and to all documentation relating to technology, 
production, and mobilization. The management was obliged to support 
the military agents with necessary accommodation and equipment. 
Faced with substandard products the military agents could halt 
acquisition and, if necessary, production itself. Managers had no right 
to interfere directly in the work of the military agents, but could appeal 
over their heads to higher authority.  
Our impression of the military agents through the Stalin period is 
that they were increasingly numerous – more than 20,000 in number 
by 1940 – and well trained. To protect their independence from 
management the military agents were salaried by the defense ministry 
and were prohibited from accepting rewards or benefits from the side 
of industry. By the standards of those they worked alongside they were 
well paid and not unduly taxed by overtime or other burdens; most 
likely for these reasons, they were generally free of corruption 
(Markevich and Harrison 2006).  
There was little, therefore, that should prevent us from seeing the 
military officers in industry as the loyal agents of their employer, the 
defense ministry. The ministry itself clearly put a high value on their 
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services: in wartime, for example, at a time when the front was crying 
out for additional officers, the ministry three times rejected proposals 
that would have redeployed many military agents to the battlefield.4  
Numerous anecdotes, moreover, testify with notable consistency 
that industry's officials and representatives saw the military agents in 
an adversarial light. This hostility arose because the military agents 
made frequent use of the main instrument at their disposal for 
enforcing quality, their right to refuse to accept goods and equipment 
that were not up to standard. By rejecting deliveries they threatened the 
ability of the defense contractors to show compliance with supply plans 
and contracts, and correspondingly threatened the careers and 
personal security of the industrial managers. 
There is no doubt that military agents were willing and able to 
exercise these powers; many cases are reported when high proportions 
of monthly deliveries were returned or scrapped, sometimes up to 100 
percent. In January and February 1934, for example, the Tula gun 
factory produced 3,000 carbines and 106 ShKAS machine guns, but 
only 800 rifles were accepted for the defense ministry and no machine 
guns at all. The 3,000 carbines "were presented for acceptance 23,000 
times, almost 8 times per carbine on average."5. In March 1938 the 
military agents rejected the entire monthly output of defense industry 
factory no. 205 "in view of the totally unsatisfactory installation of 
electric plugs in all articles supplied."6 This degree of screening was 
much tougher than that arising from industrial self-regulation. Among 
the aircraft that the OTK of factory no. 126 passed in 1940, for example, 
the military agent found up to 80 defects.7 In the first nine months of 
1940 of 6.6 million shell cases produced at munitions factory no. 184 
the OTK scrapped less than three percent; after that, the military agent 
scrapped a further 10.5 percent.8 
The power of the military agent to reject on grounds of quality was 
nonetheless more limited than might appear at first sight. One reason 
was the inability to verify observed quality to others. Military agents 
rarely looked to higher authority to impose punishments for low 
quality, and when they did they were typically unsuccessful. In 1933, 
for example, a military agent tried to use the party committee of aircraft 
factory no. 24 to bring to account those responsible for "malicious 
toleration of defective parts," but without success.9 We have found only 
one case that, of naval armament factory no. 347, where a military 
agent took the managers to court on criminal charges of supplying 
substandard goods; the court cast doubt on the accusations and the file 
was returned for further enquiries. A review by KPK, the ruling party's 
                                                   
4 Hoover/RGANI, 6/2/49: 9 (July 7, 1943). 
5 Hoover/RGANI, 6/1/22: 34 (March 7, 1934); emphasis in the 
original omitted. 
6 RGAE, 7515/1/404: 158 (Savchenko to M. Kaganovich, 1938). 
7 Hoover/RGANI, 6/2/27: 108 (July 29, 1940). 
8 Hoover/RGANI, 6/2/34: 158-159 (December 27, 1940). 
9 Hoover/RGANI, 6/1/91: 10 (March 17, 1934). 
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“control” (audit) commission, found that the judicial route was 
inappropriate and substituted dismissal for the criminal charges.10 
Another limitation on the authority of the agent was that the 
contractor had avenues of appeal, and not infrequently in shifting the 
blame for delivery problems onto the military agents. In the case of the 
rejected output of the Tula gun factory in 1934 KPK auditors concluded 
that "discord between management and representatives of military 
acceptance on the score of product quality" lay behind persistent plan 
breakdowns.11 In 1944 the KPK official for the Khabarovsk region 
reported that "vexatious litigation," with managers on one side and the 
OTK and military agents on the other, had taken hold of aircraft factory 
no. 126 on the issue of parts and components that did not conform to 
the blueprints. "These disputes . . . sometimes drag on for weeks . . . 
while business stands still."12 If agents demanded inflexible adherence 
to standards, they laid themselves open to criticism for excessive zeal or 
caution. A KPK factory report of 1940, for example, condemned the 
OTK and military agent at aircraft factory no. 126 for "a tendency to 
over-insurance."13 Surveying the work of military agents in 1943 the 
KPK demanded that "the military agent should in most cases rule on 
the acceptability of one or another deviation [from standards] so as not 
to delay products for the front."14 Thus, while military agents may have 
tried not to accept goods that were clearly unserviceable, there was 
pressure on them to tolerate some level of defects. 
Finally, the army needed weapons. In the years of urgent prewar 
rearmament, equipment supplied to military units often turned out to 
be unfit for service although the military agents had previously passed 
them as acceptable. Since high-ranking officials of the defense ministry 
were sometimes complicit in this, it must be supposed that for the 
armed forces, too, quantity was sometimes more important than 
quality. Chief of the air force purchasing administration Efimov, for 
example, was accused of colluding with malpractices: "not only did [he] 
not take measures to restore order but [he] even suppressed criticism 
of the defects, describing the communists who raised the criticisms as 
"cry-babies" and threatening them with dismissal."15 Confirmation of 
this hypothesis is found in evidence (discussed by Markevich and 
Harrison 2006) that standards were allowed to slip further in wartime. 
In short, when military agents did not rigorously enforce defense 
ministry guidelines on substandard equipment, the main reason was 
that, as loyal agents of the armed forces, they could not reject 
everything that industry supplied.  
It may be asked why, in the course of repeated interaction, the 
industrial and defense ministries did not learn about each others' 
preferences and resources so as to converge on a mutually beneficial 
                                                   
10 Hoover/RGANI, 6/6/1616: 128 (May 13, 1941). 
11 Hoover/RGANI, 6/1/22: 36 (March 7, 1934). 
12 Hoover/RGANI, 6/2/27: 108-109 (July 29, 1940). 
13 Hoover/RGANI, 6/2/27: 109 (June 29, 1940). 
14 Hoover/RGANI, 6/2/49: 9 (July 7, 1943). 
15 Hoover/RGANI, 6/2/17: 47 (KPK bureau decree, December 3, 
1939). 
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equilibrium in which the defense ministry obtained goods of the quality 
it required and the industrial contractors were able to fulfil their plans 
without the need for costly rejections and plan failures. Most likely the 
annual process of plan and contract revision prevented the hold-up 
problem from being solved by long-term contracting. Instead, the 
planning process focused each side on extracting the maximum short-
term advantage from the other, year after year. Another reason may be 
that learning was inhibited by very rapid change in the product 
assortment: in the 1930s, for example, one year's procurement of 
aircraft rarely replicated the profile of purchases in the year before to 
any significant extent. 
5. Collusion 
To summarise, the defense ministry tried to reach across the market for 
weapons by deploying thousands of military engineers to the factories 
of the defense industry. These agents had a dual role. Their first duty 
was to prevent the defense ministry from being held up and to enforce 
its contracts. They monitored the process of contract fulfilment with 
special regard to quality, and aimed to reject items for purchase when 
their quality fell below some threshold level. The work of the military 
agents made the quality of military goods to a large extent observable at 
the time of purchase. When contractors tried to cut the supply of high-
quality items, the defense ministry sought to prevent their replacement 
by low-quality items, and this opened contractors up to penalties for 
defaulting on quantity. In practice, however, the military agents and 
their superiors tended not to make trouble for the contractors over 
quantitative shortfalls. This suggests that the contractor’s cooperation 
was available at a price: the defense ministry had to accept shortfalls on 
quantity and help conceal them from the dictator's prying eyes. 
In setting out the hold-up problem in the market for weapons, we 
made two predictions. First we suggested that, when held up by the 
seller, the buyer would find it more important to uphold quality than 
quantity. Second, we suggested that buyer and seller would be jointly 
interested in collusion to conceal the resulting shortfall on quantity. 
Consistent with these expectations, we find that military agents 
typically took a harder line over quality than quantity. They were ready 
to offer some leeway to contractors over quantitative fulfilment as the 
price for maintaining quality. The outcome was a bargain which fell 
short of the initial contract but, by restoring quality at the expense of 
quantity, was more efficient than the contractor’s initial post-contract 
offer. The defense ministry was still held up, but less inefficiently than 
would have happened otherwise, and in return allowed its agents to 
help conceal the contractor’s otherwise verifiable shortcomings. 
Procurement delays were often concealed. The KPK archive 
contains many cases of reports falsified by both civilian and defense 
enterprises. The usual form was to exaggerate output over the 
accounting period by including pripiski, goods that did not exist yet but 
would be produced in the next period. Pripiski allowed the enterprise 
to claim fulfilment of the plan and entitlement to a bonus by 
"borrowing" future output. 
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This practice involved criminal deception. A single enterprise could 
not undertake it successfully in isolation, therefore; ministerial 
superiors had to know about it and the customer had to go along with it 
in silence. The wider the circle involved, the greater were the risks of 
disclosure. Despite such risks, however, in the seller's market for 
civilian goods the power of suppliers was often enough to win the 
cooperation of both superiors and purchasers (Berliner 1957). Arthur J. 
Alexander (1978: 59n) speculated that the same would be found in the 
defense industry, and the archives show that he was right. 
A KPK report of 1946 for example, claimed that a tank factory 
director "is systematically engaging in the pripiska of goods that have 
not finished production" and that his chief administration, although 
aware of this, "has not only not prevented but has even rewarded it."16 
Similarly, the KPK found that in 1944 the relevant administration of the 
armament ministry told a factory director "to report inflated 
information to the ministry."17 In September 1944 the KPK 
acknowledged that pripiski were widespread: in 1943 and 1944 an 
armament factory had "continually reported falsely inflated 
information about the fulfilment of the factory's program, typically 
using from 5 to 20 days of the following month to complete 
production"; an aircraft factory had reported "incorrectly inflated 
information about plan fulfilment" in 1943 and for the months of 
January, February, and March 1944; the managers of a tank factory 
"have also been deceiving the government and ministries by reporting 
false information on the fulfilment of the production program."18 There 
were even pripiski in a vehicle repair factory of the defense ministry 
itself; the ministry's vehicles administration, while "aware of all the 
factory's shortfalls and lack of management, took no measures to 
overcome them."19 
Widespread pripiski indicate a systematic tendency for industry to 
ignore delivery deadlines: goods were regularly delivered to the defense 
ministry a month or more late. The military agents could never have 
been unaware of this. Military agents virtually never took action to 
enforce deadlines. Of all the cases of pripiski that the KPK uncovered, 
only two were reported by military agents. In September 1941 a military 
engineer reported an unacceptable delay in an order for gas protection 
equipment placed with the ministry of general engineering.20 
Intervention by the KPK secured a new deadline for the order, but no 
penalty for the delay. In 1943 a military agent and his senior technician 
reported on "deception and irregularities" at an electrical factory; this 
led to a special audit commission which confirmed the various 
violations.21  We have found no other cases. 
                                                   
16 Hoover/RGANI, 6/2/98: 81, 85 (August 2, 1946). 
17 Hoover/RGANI, 6/2/67: 11 (1944).  
18 Hoover/RGANI, 6/6/1583: 10-13 (July 15, 1944).  
19 Hoover/RGANI, 6/6/1583: 31 (October 26, 1948). 
20 Hoover/RGANI, 6/6/47: 18 (September 29, 1941). 
21 Hoover/RGANI, 6/2/55: 1-2 (KPK bureau decree, October 28, 
1943). 
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External KPK auditors themselves uncovered other pripiski. When 
they did so, they found that the military agents had colluded in the 
deception. In 1944, for example, the military agent had joined the 
director of an armament factory in signing a cable reporting 101.5 
percent fulfilment of the April program when both knew this to be false 
since it took part of the May program into account. Significantly, higher 
officials representing both seller and buyer had approved the pripiska 
by April 30.22 They justified this on the basis of precedent; the defense 
official noted that he had approved similar arrangements in other cases 
"to avoid a breakdown of the plan and provision for the needs of the 
troops."23 It was the same in the tank factories. In 1942 the KPK officer 
for Sverdlovsk district found evidence of largescale pripiski for 
September, October, and November at the Uralmash factory not just 
"with the ministry's knowledge" but "on the instruction" of the minister 
and deputy minister, and with the collusion of the military agent.24 
In short, deadlines for the supply of armament seem to have caused 
little anxiety to military agents; and even their superiors were ready to 
approve delays. The military agents did have to look as if they 
supported firm deadlines. This led them to collude with enterprise 
managers in falsifying reports of plan fulfilment. In return, they gained 
cooperation over quality. 
Conclusions 
Military market places display obvious inefficiencies under most 
institutional arrangements, but that of the Soviet Union was 
characterized by monopoly and exclusivity to an unusual degree. This 
presents a particular problem in the scope for one side to hold up the 
other. We have shown that in the Soviet defense market it was the seller 
that was best placed to hold up the buyer. The form that the hold-up 
typically took was for the contractor to default on quality.  
This hold-up problem could not be resolved by the conventional 
means recommended by economic theory: vertical integration was not 
in Stalin's political interest, and long-term contracting was ruled out by 
the discretionary logic of command planning under a dictator. Instead, 
the defense ministry sought to solve the problem by deploying agents 
through industry to observe quality and reject substandard goods, 
threatening industrial contractors with an easily verifiable shortfall on 
quantity. The defense ministry was prepared to employ tens of 
thousands of purchasing agents and pay them well for their loyalty, 
even in the midst of a total war. These agents, however loyal, still had to 
reach a compromise with the industrial producers. In the typical 
bargain the military agents agreed to overlook quantity violations in 
return for greater cooperation on quality.  
                                                   
22 Hoover/RGANI, 6/2/63: 159-160 (June 5, 1944). 
23 Hoover/RGANI, 6/2/63: 21 (July 8, 1944). 
24 RGAE, 8752/4/108: 151-151ob (December 7, 1942).  
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